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Abstract  
The author analyzes the phenomenon of 
social mood and its impact on the inten-
sification of ethnic tensions. According to 
him, the mobility and the variability of the 
social mood can be expressed through the 
display of its intensity, which is especially 
pronounced in the deepest shifts occurring 
in the bosom of ethnic self-consciousness 
during the times of social turmoil. The 
article makes it evident that many 
international and interethnic tragedies 
could be avoided, if the authorities reacted 
to the fluctuations of social mood of the 
people on time. The sociological studies' 
of ethnic conflicts and tensions on the 
territory oftheformer USSRafterits 
disintegration serve as an illustration 
material for his theory.  
Precis  
L'auteur analyse Ie phenomene de la 
morosite sociale et son impact sur 1'inten-
sification des tensions ethniques. Selon 
lui, la mobilite et la variabilite de la 
morosite sociale tend ii s' exprimerpar la 
manifestation de son intensite, laquelle est 
particulierement prononcee lors des 
mouvements abrupts et profonds qui se 
produisent au sein de la conscience de soi 
ethnique dans les phases de troubles 
sociaux. L' article montre clairement que 
de nombreuses tragedies internationales 
et inter-ethniques pourraient are evitees si 
les autorites savaient reagir 
adequatement et au bon moment ii la fluc-
tuation de la morosite sociale. L' etude 
sociologique des con flits et tensions eth-
niques sur Ie territoire de l' ex-URSS 
apres sa desintegration sert d'illustration 
materielle de la theorie de l' auteur.  
Sergei Kharchenko, Ph.D. in sociology, is the 
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The mobility and the variability of the 
social mood can be expressed through the 
display of its intensity: strong, moderate, 
and weak. This display can be very 
evident and rough, when it springs out of 
the deepest emotions and indispensable 
and immediate aspirations of the people 
to realize in their acts the highest goal-
strong conviction in the correctness of a 
given frame of mind or restrained and 
broken values that are allowed to 
resurface. In its other extreme, the social 
mood can practically not display itself, 
being completely identified with the 
existing public consciousness, in which 
there are not enough dominant trends and 
orientations that could induce any form 
of active expression. Such passivity of 
the people allows their mood to be char-
acterized as weak in intensity.  
Stages of Ripening of the  
Intensity of the Social Mood  
The various degrees of intensity of social 
mood are especially visible in the deepest 
shifts occurring in the bosom of national 
self-consciousness during the times of 
radical social changes. This phenomenon 
can be characterized by a complex scale 
of the most diverse feelings and frames 
of mind-from the delight accompanying 
the resurgence of national identity on the 
first plane, to the disappointment and 
apathy, when the expected positive shifts 
did not occur.  
In the past, the existence of the USSR 
instilled trust in the souls of many mil-
lions of people and kept their social 
mood at a constant, stable level. There 
was the sense of patriotism in their rela-
tion to the country. In such conditions, 
people were proud in their country for its 
power and leadership. At the same time, 
the ethnosocial development in the USSR 
was rather murky. The attempts of the 
authorities to hide the con-  
 
tradictions that were arising again (though 
they had new basis) eventually led to the 
powerful outbreak of the national self-
consciousness which contributed to the 
destabilization and the collapse of the 
USSR.  
However, since World War II, the 
struggle of the main ethnic groups for 
dominance in their republics commenced 
and increased, and sometimes led to 
hidden discrimination against the 
representatives of other nations. Such 
social processes contributed to latent 
destructive action against the unity of the 
whole country. Thus, the migration 
processes, mainly the outflow of Russian 
population from the republics, began as 
early as at the end of the 1970s, when, for 
the first time, statistical information 
revealed this trend, which started in 
Georgia.1 However, despite this situation, 
nobody became interested in the social 
status and social mood of the people and 
even bothered asking questions, why 
Russians leave this God -blessed, rich, 
fertile and seemingly hospitable territory? 
Seeds of mistrust were planted in the 
minds of the people who displayed 
distrust for each other as well as 
suspicions and doubt of the officially 
proclaimed values.  
The hopes of the representatives of 
various nations at the first stage of 
perestroika were directed towards the 
revival of national cultures-their customs, 
tradition, and the renewal of interest in 
the native languages. According to an all-
Soviet research of historical 
consciousness, conducted in 1990 and 
directed by Dr. V. 1. Merkushin, the aspi-
ration to learn the historical roots of the 
country and its people was expressed by 
28 percent of the respondents of this 
study. It placed only behind the aspira-
tions to know the truth about the past 
(41%) and the desire to expand .one's 
views and outlooks (30%). About the 
same number of people (27%) said, that 
they are interested in the "life, customs, 
traditions of the peoples, and their oral  
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national creativity."2 The social mood in 
this period could be characterized as 
joyfully anticipating, active, and con-
structive.  
To a certain extent, the results of this 
research summed up the first stage in the 
development and the renewal of the 
national self-consciousness in the USSR. 
The respect for the native languages and 
the ethnic cultures, that gained 
momentum during the period of 
perestroika, contributed to the enrichment 
of the nationalidentity. Practically all 
people of the former USSR displayed a 
deep interest in their ancestors, their 
customs and language, since they were 
allowed to do so. Consequently, the so-
cial mood became more optimistic. It was 
accompanied by the expectations of a 
considerable improvement of the well-
being of the people in the near future. 
The social mood received an increasingly 
ethnosocial colouring, though its intensity 
had unilateral, emotional, impulsive 
character.  
Then, the process of reorganization of 
the whole country linked the social mood 
of the people to high expectations of 
gaining the economic sovereignty and 
even the formation of national states. 
Many politicians of nationalistic 
viewpoints in Soviet republics thought 
that it was just enough to be liberated 
from the Soviet dictatorship in order to 
bless their populations with a life better, 
than the one they experienced within the 
framework of the USSR with its dicta 
torial form of government.  
There was also another, higher level of 
fire in the nationalistic ambitions, at least 
among the intellectuals, who passionately 
preached ideas of national economic 
sovereignty. The rigid centralization so 
characteristic for the USSR that limited 
the rights and opportunities of the 
republics was fairly rejected. Thus, the 
local propaganda stressed that each of the 
republics could be much better off as an 
independent state. There were the 
numerous articles in all allied republics, 
which tried to prove that each republic 
was using much less than it produced. 
Where did the surplus go? However not 
stated openly, itwas assumed that the 
surplus went to Russia. Moreover, the 
calcula-  
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tions were done using the existing prices 
of that time in the USSR (instead of the 
world prices).  
In addition, at the same time, people 
mulled over the idea whether" centre of 
the empire" was exploiting and abusing 
them. Gradually the Russian population 
was viewed as the representatives of the" 
centre of the empire." The ideas of 
national economic sovereignty, present 
mainly in theories and accounts of 
intellectuals, entered the minds and 
penetrated deep into the consciousness of 
the masses. At first, these ideas 
pronounced themselves in the public 
desire to set down economic borders not 
only between republics, but also between 
the their inhabitants based on nationality. 
It can seem surprising, but social 
expectations and social hopes only 
strengthened the presentiment of 
economic well-being and material 
prosperity. In these conditions, the social 
mood was still far more constructive than 
destructive. The mood was elevated, 
joyfully patient, positive and healthy 
emotionally. However, exactly during 
this period, the mood of the people, 
social groups, and even nationalities 
began to absorb negative features of 
consciousness and behaviour, such as 
suspicion towards other ethnic groups, 
feeling of deprivation, and strong beliefs 
in the superiority of one nation and 
republic in the level of economic 
development and opportunities for 
achieving higher standard of living-
ifonlytheycould workindependently.  
But the intensity of social mood 
reached its apogee during the radical 
transformations in the political sphere in 
the republics, i.e. the receiving of a 
political independence, which in the end 
resulted in the break-up of the USSR and 
the formation of the new states. The 
brakes on raging nationalism and po-
litical ambitions were finally removed. 
National affairs have moved to the third 
stage-a stage of building sovereignty. 
The logic ofleaders of nationalistic 
orientation at that time was very 
transparent-national, cultural and 
economic questions could be fruitfully 
addressed only after the victory of their 
political platform. The public con-  
 
sciousness in these conditions became an 
object of active manipulation, and the 
social mood \\;as associated with national 
and ethnic interests only.  
In 1991, for example, the official au-
thorities of the Ukraine jumped to the 
conclusion that people voted for the 
break-up of Russia, for burial of the 
Unitarian state, after the overwhelming 
majority of the population positively 
answered to a question given in the 
autumn 1991: "Do you want to live in a 
free and democratic country?" What was 
the basis for such conclusion and the 
relevance to the opinion of the people of 
Ukraine, who in the spring that year 
supported the idea of preservation of the 
USSR? After all, who does not want to 
live in a free and democratic country? 
Thus, how such questions and answers 
should be interpreted becomes a critical 
issue, especially during great social 
upheavals.  
Such tricky and misleading referenda, 
as well as conclusions drawn from them, 
formed the ground not only for the 
nationalistic ambitions of the local 
political leaders, but also provoked a part 
of the population to display the worst 
human qualities-open prejudice towards 
other ethnic groups. These conditions 
implanted in the minds of the population 
the idea of revisiting historical claims, 
debts, and insults (apparent and 
imagined) that were often not only a 
century, but also a thousand years old. 
This simultaneous, "teleological" and 
spontaneous disruption of the former 
structure of the relations between various 
ethnic groups resulted in the growth of 
social and sociopsychological discomfort 
among the people.  
The people became also more dis-
turbed by the rising international con-
flicts. Even in ethnically homogenous 
regions, there might be a very high level 
of anxiety. Experts have named 36 (some 
up to 150) areas in Russia (and outside 
Russia), in which the international con-
flicts are close to erupting. Economic, 
and more often political, claims are often 
kept in disguise hidden behind legitimate 
national aspirations and the debates on 
national culture, sovereignty and 
language. National interests  
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often serve as the screen for political 
claims and ambitions, lust for power and 
authority and special privileges.  
Many international tragedies could be 
avoided, if authorities had reacted to 
mass social mood in a timely fashion. For 
example, in the 1960s and 1970s, in the 
Kazakhstan republic, the idea of the 
creation of an independent area for Ger-
mans, who were violently deported in 
1940s from the Volga region, became an 
issue. However, this idea was not sup-
ported by the official authorities of 
Kazakhstan. Consequently, the republic 
has lost (and continues to lose due to 
emigration) tens of thousands of efficient, 
disciplined professionals. A barrier of 
political alienation between Germans and 
Kazakhs has been created and has caused 
instability in industrial spheres. The data 
of the State Committee of republic says 
that "nonnative" population makes up 76 
percent of those employed in the 
industrial sector. This percentage is even 
higher in coal mining.3  
Analyzing the condition of the mood 
in connection with interethnic and 
national mutual relations, one is com-
pelled to draw a disappointing conclu-
sion. As for at the moment, the 
international level of intensity remains 
high in the former republics of USSR. 
Answers given by approximately half of 
the questioned representatives of various 
groups testify to the tense relations 
between the peoples of the former USSR, 
and one quarter of them even allows for 
an opportunity of occurrence of the con-
flicts on the nationallevel.4  
Levels of Intensity  
Empirical research and analysis of the 
conflicts show that there are three levels 
of intensity in interethnic relations that 
affect a degree of intensity of social 
mood of specific ethnic groups, nations.  
The first one, ethnic limitations (i.e., 
unwillingness to have contacts with those 
who do not subscribe to one's national or 
ethnic ethos), is the most common. It 
exhibits itself in increasing support for 
mono-ethic families (there is the 
reduction in the number of mixed 
marriages), in preference to work in 
"mono-national" collectives, and in the  
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monopolization of the establishment of 
all levels by the representatives of one 
ethnic group.s  
Practically all of the peoples, espe-
cially those who in ethnic states or ethnic 
and territorial autonomy, suffer from this 
illness, which is often a starting point for 
the formation of selfish national mood, 
and consequently the destruction of 
international consent. During the initial 
stage of creation of nationalistic and 
chauvinist views and intentions, the 
social mood as a whole is peaceful and 
favourable towards the others, and it does 
not provide the framework for individual 
negative episodes of ethnic conflict, 
which at this stage do not are not given a 
special meaning.,A more complex 
situation has arisen during the birth of the 
new independent states in the territory of 
the former USSR, after new structures of 
official and informal mutual relations of 
the people of various ethnicity started to 
form. Russians have suffered the most in 
this new political reality. In the majority 
of the newly independent states, they 
have become an ethnic minority, 
discriminated against by various far-
fetched restrictions and regulations.  
The second level of interethnic tension 
is ethnic selfishness (keeping the 
privileges by one ethnic group at the 
expense of the others). It is a step not 
only towards creating tensions in the 
relationships between people, but also 
towards a high degree of intensity of the 
social mood of the people of different 
ethnic backgrounds,  
As sociological surveys show, that up 
to 30-40 percent of the native people of 
the republics consider as naturalhaving 
more privileges than other ethnic groups 
living there. However, the employment 
of Russians is still greater in industry 
and, partly, in science, public health 
services, and education. At the same 
time, in all other spheres and branches of 
the state and economy, the percent of 
Russians is lower than the percent of the 
dominant groups. In Baltic states, for 
example, de facto there are even strong 
restrictions on the usage of natural 
resources on the basis of ethnic 
background. Shares are withheld from  
 
Russian shareholders and provided only 
to the native people.6  
In Dagestan, ethnic selfishness is dis-
played in tensions between Laks and 
Koumics over of the Koumics' land, 
while, Nogais want a unification of all the 
Nogai territories, divided some time ago 
between Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, 
and Chechnya.7  
In these conditions the social mood 
becomes infected with the virus of sus-
picion and mistrust; expectation of 
negative consequences and lose of sta-
bility are on the rise. Thus, under certain 
circumstances, social tensions on an 
interpersonal level as well as on a mass 
scale may erupt.  
Ethnic selfishness can pass into a third 
a stage-ethnophobia, characterized by a 
direct and irreconcilable hostility towards 
to others. The violent displays of 
ethnophobia could be observed in 
Armenian-Azeri, GeorgianAbchazian 
conflicts, and also in Osetin-Ingush 
conflict, when even on an interpersonal 
level the hate, lack of tolerance, and 
accusation of each other continue up to 
day. Also separate regions that belong to 
Cossacks and those in Northern Caucasus 
are on the verge of open conflicts 
between various social and ethnic groups.  
The explosive power of this phenom-
enon lays in a sphere of emotions sub-
jected to ill-conceived suggestions and 
ideology. Domestic chauvinism-a 
phenomenon the function of which is to 
mobilize irrational emotions, is the 
powerful source of irritation, indignation, 
and hate. The existing prejudices and 
biases can serve as a strong motive for 
not only amoral, but also illegal, and 
deliberate actions against people who do 
not share common ethos.  
In any society there are followers of 
ethos, which is the subject or object of 
aggressive nationalism, and even chau-
vinism, or both. In addition, domestic 
chauvinism appeals to and is strengthen 
by the national pride, illdefined sense of 
honour, presence of deformed 
judgements, false estimations, and false 
facts in people's consciousness. The 
phenomenon of domestic chauvinism as 
the category of real mood and social 
action does not  
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inherent to it, neither certain psycho-
logical or physiological type with a spe-
cial set of peculiarities, which would 
differ from all other people. The carrier 
of the phenomenon of aggressive na-
tionalism and chauvinism can be persons 
from any social layer, independent of 
their profession, social status and 
intelligence. The infinite number of 
variations possible circumstances and 
events that can provoke this kind of 
attitude and behaviour do not leave much 
room for hope that some types of people 
or social groups are safe from a 
"backfiring" reaction.  
Thus, it has to be emphasized again 
tha t the most dangerous form of ethnic 
phobia is domestic chauvinism, which 
poisons the social mood of all parties 
participating in the conflict.  
Deformed Intensity  
For each person to compare one's nation 
to other nations and other people is a 
normal, and healthy process, as long as 
the understanding of the differences does 
lead to the feelings of superiority and a 
belief in exceptional character of one's 
nation or ethnic group.  
The aspiration to superiority also 
appears when the person's rights are 
restrained, as well as when the opportu-
nity to display self and build personal 
well-being is denied. Such a person 
searches for economic, political, and 
other reasons of his/her predicament. 
However, the answer is often found in the 
national injustice towards particular 
individuals as well as representatives of 
certain ethnic groups or nations. Then the 
exp lanation of all failures, mis-
calculations, errors, and falls becomes 
extremely simple-the other ethnic groups 
are guilty of everything.  
When people of other ethnic groups in 
search of superiority offend a person, he 
or she no longer looks exclusively into 
personal experience. Thus the danger of 
deformed national consciousness arises. 
After being exposed to "facts" and 
"figures" provided by nationalistic 
propaganda, such a person begins to link 
his /her experience with those of other 
representatives of his /her people. In such 
case, personal insults are added  
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to those insults and historical injustices 
suffered by one's ethnic group ornation. 
Unpublished sociological research con-
ducted between 1992 and 1997 indicates 
that from fifteen to thirty percent of the 
respondents reflect this mode rof 
thinking.  
Domestic chauvinism certainly has 
some objective basis. During the period 
of Soviet rules, many miscalculations, 
errors, and bad decisions were made. 
Even the internment of the large number 
of people took place. Severe scars have 
been left on the historical memory of the 
people. Therefore, instead of promoting 
the search for historical justice, the past 
often serves as the excuse for revenge in 
form of the infringement of the rights and 
the freedom of other people.  
Another reason for the occurrence of 
domestic chauvinism is the fact that in 
these turbulent times, many people have 
lost social and professional identity. 
Collective labour has been devalued. 
Also, the identification of oneself as a 
Soviet citizen or person has been rejected 
by the majority of people and remained 
only as an unpleasant memory. However, 
people cannot live without identifying 
themselves with their environment. In the 
conditions of disorder, the idea of 
national belonging became attractive for 
many people and filled the existing 
identification vacuum. Already in 1990, 
according to the data of an all-Union 
research, most of the respondents ,62 
percent, felt pride for their own people 
and nation, and 30 percent for collective 
labour, while 38 percent for their city or 
village. Due to the growing disorder in 
the country, the tendency to identify with 
one's nation or ethnic group has increased 
even more and has become, in opinion of 
many sociologists, the leading for of 
social identification.8 While considering 
this phenomenon and its role in the 
expression of the social mood, it is 
necessary to note that no single people or 
nation was free (and in foreseeable future 
will not be free) from domestic 
chauvinism. The dislike or even hate 
towards representatives of other peoples 
is displayed either openly and directly, or 
in a hidden and more passive way.  
 
The most elementary form of chau-
vinism is represented by jokes about 
people of other ethnic backgrounds. 
These distortions of reality are fed by 
prejudices and negative stereotypes, from 
which no people are free. However, they 
are often the nuclei of domestic 
chauvinism, once they start to serve as 
the justification for the discriminatory 
policy and actions against other nations 
and ethnic groups.  
Amore serious and deep harbinger of 
domestic chauvinism is the aspiration or 
tendency to become isolated inhomo-
geneous ethnic environment in work, 
sociallife,leisure, and daily life. However, 
the significant majority of the people in 
the former USSR (it is shown by the 
research done in the sixties and seventies) 
seemed to be free of such prejudices, and 
were even proud of the fact that they 
worked with colleagues from other ethnic 
groups, and had friends among them as 
well as sharing residence with the 
representatives of various ethnicities.  
There are also people (and now this 
proportion has increased a little and 
makes up about 10%), who are convinced 
in the utility of mono-cultural collectives 
and mono-cultural friendship and oppose 
mixed marriages. What about many 
intellectuals, who pretend to be open 
minded and in theory accept mixed 
marriages, but object to their children 
marrying someone of different ethnic, 
national or racial origin? Such flaw in 
public consciousness and its active form-
social mood, is not as harmless as it 
seems to be on the first sight. It can be 
even more noxious, if itis hidden under a 
verbal peel of conventional reasoning.  
It is necessary to mention few more 
features of domestic chauvinism. It is 
insolent, unforgiving and often loud. 
These qualities of domestic chauvinism 
and the primitivism of their display have 
often greater social appeal than 
reasonable and judicious politics. When 
such dangerous social and psychological 
mechanisms persist, they can only be 
stopped by psychological measures or by 
other means which vagaries of the social 
mood would have difficulty overcoming.  
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It can be said without any exaggera-
tion, that domestic chauvinism is perilous 
to all without exception-small and large 
ethnic groups as well. The majority of the 
people understand or intuitively feel it, 
for it is often the main cause of national 
conflicts, bloodshed, "ethnic cleansing" 
and even genocide. That is why their fear 
of ethnic conflicts caused by the domestic 
chauvinism and vagaries of social mood 
is almost as strong as fear of economic 
problems and open violence.9 However, 
the problem would be only half as large if 
open daily dialogue and healthy common 
consciousness were allowed to limit its 
scope.  
The scary fact is that domestic chau-
vinism is ingrained in state policy of 
many newly independent republics, 
espgcially when it comes to the local 
economic affairs. People have always 
been interested in their economic situa-
tion and the others. As long the compari-
sons on macro level were made by 
professionals and good journalists, 
counting who" got more" was not so 
dangerous. But when the problem of 
debts of other nations and other states 
received ethnic and national colouring, 
the comparisons between native people 
and other groups began. The latter were 
first called "migrants," or "uninvited 
visitors;" later they became "occupants."  
Thus, a number of new states began 
organizing "ethnic cleansing." This policy 
was openly carried out in the Baltic 
republics, despite the fact that democratic 
reforms received powerful support form 
the majority of the local Russian 
population. Moreover, in a number of 
cases the Russian intellectuals supported 
claims to sovereignty. However, when 
their efforts and their merits were not 
only ignored, but also are used against 
them, the disappointment of many 
democratically oriented Russians was 
bitter.  
But, even the Russian official policies 
employ domestic chauvinism. That, for 
example, is visible in the declarations of 
ultra nationalistic politicians such as 
Barkashov or Lisenko, who swing the 
bugaboo of broken Russian honour 
during the time of their election cam-  
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paign of autumn 1995 and summer 1996. 
Unfortunately, many other political 
parties do not lag behind; trying to use, 
the most suitable and catchy ideas and 
slogans which have a strong nationalistic 
flavour.  
Ethnic hostility did not arise suddenly. 
First, it ripened underground, thanks to 
the "merits" of the nationalimperious 
elite. What it can turn to and what threats 
it poses to Russia, can be deduced form 
the experience of Yugoslavia and the 
events in Dniestr republic, Abchazia, 
Karabach, Tadzhikistan, Chechnya.  
The war in Chechnya, in its initial 
stage, seemed to serve a patriotic pur-
pose. The central government of Russia 
set the objective to bring order and pun-
ish those who conceived the notion of 
Chechnya independence that led to the 
break-up of the integrity of Russia. Yet 
the means to achieve this objective were 
chosen incorrectly, as the struggle with 
the initiators of sovereignty of Chechnya 
expanded into a war against all of 
Chechnya's people. At the beginning of 
the war, the sociopolitical mood of the 
majority of Russians was supportive to 
the government policy of restoring order 
in Chechnya. However, when the people 
realized the essence of this war, they 
started to protest very sharply against its 
continuation. It is a pity the Russian 
government responded to their opinion 
with the enviable indifference. Russia 
will dearly pay for that, because, 
Chechnya might not be completely re-
stored even in the 21st century.  
Domestic chauvinism also becomes 
dangerous if it is fed by ill-conceived 
discussions often supported by the media 
about "which culture is older than 
which," and "which ethnic group con-
tributed more to literature," and "who had 
what and who owned which territory, and 
when" etc. People, previously at peace 
with each other, suddenly begin to 
remember personal insults, look for 
comfort in some historical events, tally 
up ancient wars which occurred on their 
territory and project their meaning onto 
the present situation. The official 
propaganda of the many arising states 
consciously stirs such interests in order to 
heat up the emotions and awake  
 
unhealthy feelings of resentment and 
revenge, pushing the compatriots into 
dark business. Thus old wounds are 
opened again, and venom of hatred in-
flicts many sources of mass information.  
Once domestic chauvinism is given a 
free ride, it promotes the rise of prejudice 
towards other ethnic groups in the name 
of ill-defined national interests. The end 
result is often an open display of hate 
leading to bloodshed, and long years of 
poisoned thinking, and deformed social 
mood.  
Social Mood and Potential for  
Conflict  
The analysis of the rise of ethnic self-
consciousness in the former USSR, with 
all its pluses and minuses shows clearly, 
thatit has high potential to create 
conflicts, and these conflicts in many 
respects determine the condition of the 
prevailing social mood. The study of the 
Centre of Sociology of interethnic rela-
tions in 1994 shows that, at present, in 
number of regions of the country, during 
ethnic conflicts, social status ofthe people 
of particular ethnic groups acquires a 
special meaning and affects the mutual 
relations between them. This is displayed 
in a number of cases:  
1) In rather obvious functioning of 
negative national stereotypes in mass 
consciousness. When asked whether 
there is an ethnic group to which the 
respondents feel hostility, 11 percent 
of respondents in Bashkortostan, 27 
percent in Moscow, and 24 percent in 
Kareliya gave an affirmative answer.  
2) In a rather strong belief that the na-
tional belonging or ethnicity deter-
mines the economic and material 
situation of the people. Some re-
spondents think that there are ethnic 
groups today that live financially 
better: 11 percent in Bashkortostan, 
48 percent in Moscow, and 32 percent 
of Karelia. In the case of deterioration 
of a material situation some groups 
(especially Azeri, Armenians, the 
Jews) can become victims of these 
beliefs.  
3) The support for infringement of ethnic 
interests is strong in the mass  
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frequently speak about it. 10 The 
conflict potential arising from  
the deterioration of social mood is often 
exacerbated by the personnel selection 
made by the authorities of all levels, both 
central and local. Very often, the ap-
pointment to the office, good job, and 
acceptance to high school depends on 
person's ethnicity. Also the decision to 
introduce one language as the state lan-
guage, i.e. language spoken by the local 
ethnic group, and ignoring the role of the 
Russian laI1guage, augments to the 
problem.  
Thus, the social mood is influenced by 
the objective processes that take place in 
the political life in the former Soviet 
republics. These include: the 
disintegration of USSR, declaration of  
-independence of formerly allied republics, 
by creation of nation-state systems, by 
turning of a significant number of the 
Russian population into "second grade" 
citizens (this started with the passing of 
the law of the state language and not 
granting Russian any official status), with 
the inevitability of occurrence in the new 
states of Slavic movement and their links 
with the Russian national ( or 
nationalistic) movement in Russia itself.  
The existence of these and otherprob-
lems in the life of the people of postallied 
republics puts their social mood in a 
position of extreme instability and strong 
fluctuations. The results of sociological 
surveys, and also analysis of the literature 
and materials, published in press, 
transmitted by TV and the radio, enable 
the drawing of a conclusion, that the 
intensified social mood of the population 
during a transition period is subject to 
serious deformations.  
There is another serious problem that 
has to be solved is that a certain part of 
citizens who previously had Soviet citi-
zenship and certain rights, lost them after 
the collapse of the USSR, but did not 
regain them in the newly created states in 
which they found themselves. This is a 
legal and political, but not an ethnic 
problem. The rights of the individual, in 
opinion of the developers of the national 
doctrines in Russia, have an independent 
meaning and often do  
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not coincide with interests of the nation.l1 
It is quite possible to agree with the 
authors, offering to divide problems of 
citizenship, and interests of ethnicities 
and peoples. But two things have to be 
kept in mind: that the rights of the people 
determine the character of the 
international and ethnic relations, the 
internal policy and the whole political 
climate of the states; and that the "human 
face" of these processes is socialmood.  
Taking into consideration all points of 
view, a legitimate way out of the given 
deadlock lies in the creation of a new 
union based on a commonly shared eco-
nomic interests, cultural aspirations, legal 
values. This could be achieved by the 
unconditional removal of trade barriers, 
an establishment of a new economic and 
defensive union, and introduction of 
common citizenship.  
The number of researchers believe, 
that in order to improve the interethnic 
relations, and to turn the social mood in 
the direction of positive emotions, it is 
not at all necessary to adhere to a one, 
uniform blueprint for peaceful settlement 
of various sorts of conflict. Most likely, 
during the search of ways for the 
formation of a positive social mood of the 
population it is necessary to be guided by 
the following principles:  
• Principle of observance or restoration 
of peace between ethnicities and 
peoples, and resolving conflicts by 
only political and nonviolent meth-
ods;  
• Principle of sequential democracy, 
including the observance of the rights 
of the individual, and the rights of 
ethnicities. These rights can be in 
conflict with each other. But that is 
what the art of political government 
should be all about-making 
acceptable decisions in each 
particular case;  
• Principle of a flexible, individual 
approach to solving each problem in 
mutual relations between peoples, so 
that all sides can be satisfied;  
• Principle of deep scientific expertise 
about regional wars and interethnic 
conflicts. In this,area, due to imperi-
ous structures of the political estab-
lishment, it was impossible to avoid  
 
impulsive politics that cost so 
dearly,12  
The analysis of s,?ciological informa-
tion shows that in each republic the el-
ements of ethnic separatism are 
displayed. And in these conditions, even 
if there will be positive changes in the 
economy and political sphere, the 
interethnic conflicts will not automati-
cally disappear. They have their own 
logic, origin and development and can be 
characterized by rather heavy and steady 
inertia. Just as the historical memory of 
the peoples collects and keeps all the 
personal insults, the social mood of living 
generations is not capable of quickly 
overcoming feelings of ethnic hostility 
caused by the present unjustness. This is 
why the problems associated with 
realization and fulfilment of ethnic 
interests are capable of becoming-and in 
reality have become-the catalyst for 
alienation of people from each other.  
Conclusion  
The analysis of the degree of intensity of 
social mood allows to draw several con-
clusions.  
Firstly, at each level of intensity both 
positive and negative features charac-
terize the social mood. It displays itself 
not so much by the prevalence of some of 
them, but through their combination. This 
makes it hard to divide into clearly 
defined stages the ever-changing condi-
tions and the content of social problems, 
as well as the fluctuation of a saturated 
social mood.  
Secondly, the social mood-tension of 
both positive and negative character can 
accumulate secretly in the depths of 
public consciousness and can later de-
velop into open forms of activity of the 
people.  
Thirdly, any degree of intensity of the 
social mood in a reality can (and fre-
quently it does) act in a deformed way, 
that is especially characteristic of socie-
ties in a transition period. In this case, the 
social mood has a great deal of suspicion, 
distortions and dislike of individuality.  
Fourth, the social mood and degree of 
its intensity are hugely influenced by  
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historical memory of the people. For 
example, the preservation of the ethos of 
Northern Caucasus in the historical 
consciousness, especially the Caucasus 
war in the XIX Century,13 as well as the 
memory of the huge shocks of the XX 
century (the civil war, Wodd WadI, the 
hardest years of reconstruction, and 
Stalin's reprisal in the 1930s and 1940s), 
playa significant role in the lives oflocal 
people. That explains the deep restraint 
of the people during economic and social 
conflicts.  
!tis beyond any doubt, that the strong 
intensity of the social mood in the Rus-
sian society, in many respects deter-
mines, and in the foreseeable future will 
determine the character of interethnic 
relations as well as the degree of 
interethnic conflicts .••  
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